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Abstract: 
In recent decades, IGOs, NGOs, private firms and even states have begun to regularly package 
and distribute information on the relative performance of states. From the World Bank's Ease of 
Doing Business Index to the Financial Action Task Force blacklist, Global Performance 
Indicators (GPIs) are increasingly deployed to influence governance globally. We argue that 
GPIs derive influence from their ability to frame issues, extend the authority of the creator, and 
— most importantly — to invoke recurrent comparison that stimulate governments' concerns for 
their own and their country's reputation. Their public and ongoing ratings and rankings of states 
are particularly adept at capturing attention not only at elite policy levels but also among other 
domestic and transnational actors. GPIs thus raise new questions for research on politics and 
governance globally. What are the social and political effects of this form of information on 
discourse, policies and behavior? What types of actors can effectively wield GPIs and on what 
types of issues? In this symposium introduction, we define GPIs, describe their rise, and theorize 
and discuss these questions in light of the findings of the symposium contributions. 
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Introduction: The Power of Global Performance Indicators 
Judith G. Kelley and Beth A. Simmons 
 
Political leaders care about their reputations. Moreover, they appear to care about their 
reputations relative to their peers. Entrepreneurial actors have seized on this as an opportunity for 
policy influence. They have taken advantage of the competitive pressures of globalization, the 
increasing accountability demands flowing from democratization, and the transformative 
capacities of new information technologies to nudge global governance in important ways by 
deploying what we call Global Performance Indicators (GPIs) – regularized public assessments 
that rate, rank and categorize state policies, qualities, and/or performance. Such GPIs aim to 
(re)define global standards, contrive competition and provoke action according to specific 
performance criteria. They exemplify how states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks and other states seek to use modern 
information politics to invoke reputational concerns and influence policy through the pressure of 
comparison.  
Performance assessments and associated indicators permeate human activity, 
internationally and nationally, across public and private spheres. Some, such as product ratings in 
Consumer Reports, or national credit ratings by Standard and Poor’s (S&P), have been around 
for decades; many are intended to inform private decision making.  More recently, agenda-
motivated indicators such as the country ratings of Freedom in the World by Freedom House or 
the Ease of Doing Business Index by the World Bank have appeared. Such indicators overtly and 
purposively seek to engage actors at the highest levels of government and influence their policies 
and governance practices.  
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The rising use of indicators has prompted debates about their construct validity, use and 
misuse.1 Scholarship has flourished about methodology, reliability, and fairness for a broad 
range of indicators and have problematized quantification generally.2 We build on a range of 
insights – from sociology to anthropology to political science – but the symposium focuses on 
intentional efforts to use comparative information to influence policy and governance. Why do 
states and other important actors care about ratings and rankings? Is effective use of GPIs 
confined to already-powerful actors such as the US, or can GPIs contribute to a diffusion of 
authority? And if a GPI is effective, does it work primarily through material leverage, or are 
other mechanisms, such as reputational or social pressure, at work as well?  
This symposium expands our ability to answer these questions by examining the effects 
of four GPIs: The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business (EDB) Index, the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) for education, the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) “blacklist” 
of non-complying jurisdictions, and an NGO called Publish What You Fund’s Aid Transparency 
(AT) Index. The papers present evidence that these GPIs influence the discourse, standards, and 
measurement, but also examine whether and how they change actions. Do they reverberate in 
domestic politics, provoke bureaucracies, shape policy agendas and influence outputs? Do they 
influence the reactions and responses of donors and market actors? If they alter priorities, do they 
have unintended consequences as well? This symposium aims to speak directly to how GPIs 
might alter politics, policies and, more speculatively, even broader authority structures. 
 
                                                          
1 Malito, Umbach, and Bhuta 2018. 
2 Arndt et al. 2006 ; Ginsburg et al. 2005 ; Høyland, Moene, and Willumsen 2012 ; van de Walle 2006. The World 
Bank’s Governance Indicators are a potent example. See Apaza 2009. For a critique of their construct validity see 
Thomas 2010. 
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I. Global Performance Indicators: definition, scope, and context 
Global performance indicators are defined as a named collection of rank-ordered data that 
purports to represent the past or projected performance of different units.3 While thousands of 
basic indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) exist to facilitate research or 
policymaking, and while all such quantification is normative and contestable,4 this symposium 
focuses on the consequences of overtly strategic state rating and ranking systems that package 
and deploy information intentionally for policy advocacy and implementation. Such GPIs 
assemble selected data – facts and statistics collected together for reference or analysis – to craft 
“new” information designed and publicized to complement advocacy for specific ends. We focus 
on GPIs that, in their purest form, meet all the following criteria:  
• Public and easily available.  
• Regular and published on a predictable schedule.  
• Purposive, explicitly normative, policy focused 
• Deployed to influence state-level outcomes.  
• Comparative of the performance of multiple states within a region or more broadly.  
GPIs can take several forms. Indexes or indicators use numbers or grades to rate or rank 
state performance, compressing enormous variance into a simplified scale.5 Categorical 
assessments use ordinal categories to produce (un)flattering peer groups, while Blacklists and 
Watchlists draw stark distinctions between compliers and offenders. Hybrid systems are also 
common, as are accompanying country narratives and policy recommendations. 
                                                          
3 Davis et al. 2012 ; Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry 2012 ; Davis, Merry, and Kingsbury 2015 ; Merry and Conley 
2011. 
4 Fioramonti 2013.  
5 Broome and Quirk 2015 ; Büthe 2012 ; Davis et al. 2012 ; Hansen 2012 ; Karpik 2010. 
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Basic indicators are hardly new – sovereign credit ratings first appeared in 1916 – but 
nearly all the GPIs that fit our definition were created after 1990.6 To demonstrate the trend, we 
systematically gathered a database based on secondary literature, extensive searches of 
newspapers and magazines and the wider web, using terms such as ranking, rating, index, 
blacklist, and watchlist. Each entry was coded among other things on launch year, regularity, 
purpose, creator type, country of origin, issue area(s), and the type of comparison used. To be 
included, a GPI had to have been created no later than 2015. This search produced 282 entries. 
Extensive culling7 left 159 entries that met our criteria, and of these, 133 were still active as of 
2018, meaning they had had been updated in 2015 or later.8 These 159 were included in the 
source data for Figure 1. The dataset is available in the online appendix.  
 GPI growth has been nearly exponential. While it took almost three decades to approach 
20 GPIs in the late 1990s, by the next decade the number had roughly quadrupled, and then in 
the next 15 it more than tripled. This proliferation responded to growing demand for policy-
relevant performance data, spurred by a consensus that many past development reforms and 
governance structures were failing,9 and facilitated by the fact that information was becoming 
ever easier to collect, process and disseminate. 
 
                                                          
6 Löwenheim 2008. 
7 Of the 289, 29 were never reissued, so failed the regularity criteria. Another 28 were aimed at investors, so failed 
the policy purpose. Yet 30 had no explicit intent stated, so while they might qualify, they fell in a gray zone and for 
clarity of criteria, we noted them separately. Another 31 were just data (and clearly, we could have found hundreds 
more that would fit this category). A few others fell in other categories that didn’t fit. 
8 The data collection concluded in July 2018. 
9 Arndt 2008 ; Arndt et al. 2006.  Governance measures are the major theme in the Malito et al (2018) essay 
collection. 
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Figure 1: GPI Contestation across issues, time and creators. Source: Authors’ database.  
Notes: “Environment” covers Energy and environment. “Human rights” covers human 
rights, gender issues and press freedom. “Trade & Finance” covers Trade, Finance and 
Technology. Social covers health and social issues. All other topics are as coded in the 
dataset in the appendix. 
 
As both the demand and supply of indicators grew, various actors began to realize that 
they could deploy GPIs as policy tools. A host of new GPIs, ranging from Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index to the OECD’s Program for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) rankings began to flourish. Their labels became more normative and vivid; 
their content ever more actionable; their messages increasingly displayed to deliver visual 
impact. Recent GPIs are relentlessly comparative, suggesting an intention to pressure, shame or 
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provoke competition among states. Competitive prompts are clear in many GPIs’ publicity 
messages. For example, when releasing the latest PISA rankings, the OECD announced: 
“Singapore tops latest OECD PISA global education survey.”10 Thus, GPIs are increasingly 
deployed to stimulate state competition and shape policy agendas; that is, as “technologies of 
power.”11 
II. A theory of GPI power 
Why should governments care about a simple ranking or rating, especially if it merely 
reformats preexisting information? We theorize that the power of GPIs is a function of their 
ability to engage reputations. Ratings and rankings stoke politicians’ and bureaucrats’ 
reputational concerns by framing, establishing “standards,” and repeatedly engendering public 
comparisons. The packaging and intentional deployment of comparative information is thus an 
inherently social process that stimulate reputational concerns with how others view the 
performance of the state elites’ competence, effectiveness and status. These concerns can operate 
through multiple pathways, depending on local values and institutions.  
 
Sources of GPI power: Information, Contestation and the Power to Frame 
The social process of GPI influence begins with their ability to frame issues. GPI 
promulgators seek to influence targets by designing an attention-grabbing form of political 
communication. By naming an issue, coining a vocabulary for describing it, and creating 
                                                          
10 OECD website http://www.oecd.org/education/singapore-tops-latest-oecd-pisa-global-education-
survey.htm, last accessed July 21, 2018. 
11 Hansen 2012. 
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categories for its assessment, promulgators hope to impact discourse and ultimately policy.12 
This influence is akin to what Davis et al call “knowledge effects”13 and what Pierre Bourdieu 
terms “symbolic power” — or the power to name and categorize.14  In some cases, the process 
begins by collecting new data; in others, existing data is presented in ways that prioritize new 
objectives. Such efforts shape how publics, organizations and policymakers think about “what 
constitutes legitimate social practice.”15   
GPIs are both products of, and inputs into, active value contestation. Nowhere is this 
clearer than in the struggle to define, measure and rate “development” over recent years.16 The 
United Nation’s Human Development Index was created in 1990, adding lifespan, education, and 
low fertility to traditional GDP per capita measures to reflect new concerns with the quality of 
life. A decade later (2000), the UN new Gender Equality Index looked at disparities between 
men’s and women’s quality of life as the central conceptual issue.17 The Fraser Institute 
contested both of these trends with its rival Index of Human Progress (2001) that restored weight 
to high-income levels and reflected the Institute’s interest in supporting competitive markets.18 In 
2006, the Sustainable Society Foundation, an NGO headquartered in the Netherlands, touted its 
eponymously named index to contest the notion that unbounded growth is desirable.19 In short, 
creators of GPIs frame successful performance in preferred directions, often crowding the market 
with GPIs that jostle for agenda-setting visibility.20  
                                                          
12 Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007. 
13 Davis, Merry, and Kingsbury 2015. 
14 Bourdieu 1989. 
15 Hansen 2012. 
16 For the history of the Human Development Index, see Stanton 2007. For the World Bank’s Governance Indicators 
see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido August 1999. 
17 United Nations, Gender Inequality Index, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii  
18 See https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/MeasuringDevelopmentIHP.pdf.  
19 See http://www.ssfindex.com/.  
20 Miller 2005.  
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Evidence of contestation across multiple GPI sectors is suggested in Figure 1. It shows 
the gradual uptake of GPIs in different issues areas. A lack of consensus may be one motivation 
for creating new GPIs and may partly explain the variation in density across issues. For example, 
while there is likely a greater demand for information about economic and financial performance 
which has led to a greater supply by actors keen to dominate such visible issues, it is also likely 
that the lack of consensus around what constitute favorable policies and ideal outcomes has 
contributed to the proliferation. Indeed, although we excluded indicators created simply to 
inform investors, over a quarter of the GPIs meeting our definition (36) focused on economic 
issues with several alternatives measures of prosperity and wellbeing to contest the traditional 
GDP. Many GPIs also are concerned with various education or social issues (29%), governance 
(20%), development (20%), and environment (17%), with several clusters covering hybrids of 
these issues as well. Many such hybrids represent efforts to contest narrow measures and 
advocate for broader conceptualizations of policy priorities. This is one reason the classification 
of GPIs into issue areas results in several that fall in multiple categories. Many are meant 
precisely to pull traditional conceptions such as growth in unconventional direction, for example 
toward justice. 
  
Social Knowledge and Authority 
A key source of GPI power is the credibility and authority of its creator.21 What makes 
some GPI creators more authoritative than others? The social psychology literature suggests that 
one source of legitimate authority is trust, which, in turn, develops out of a perception that an 
                                                          
21 On private authority in international relations, see Hall and Biersteker 2002. 
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actor is fair, knowledgeable, and/or competent.22 This may explain why many GPI creators 
attempt to bolster their credibility by transparently describing and defending their index’s 
methodology. As importantly, actors who themselves are thought to exemplify specific norms 
are more likely to be viewed as authoritative in judging them,23 and to have “normative power,” 
which Manners defines as the ability to shape conceptions of what is “normal.”24   
GPI creators also gain authority based on their (assumed) competence and expertise,25 
which in turn may be inferred from their tangible power and wealth. The assumption that global 
competence in governance, economic policy and human rights for example resides in the western 
democracies, while contestable, has reinforced their “authority” to rate others in these areas. This 
may explain why, according to our data, organizations headquartered in the Global North create 
about 98 percent of the GPIs in existence today.   
Social knowledge and authority is also supported by the tangible and intangible 
advantages of network centrality. Non-state actors with access to decision makers are better able 
to mine information and deploy it to assert authority.26 States also have important network 
resources useful in developing and deploying GPIs. For example, the United States Department 
of State, which creates the Trafficking in Persons Report and grades country performance, uses 
its embassies and NGO contacts around the world to tap into many sources of information. 
                                                          
22 Espeland and Sauder 2007 ; Rieh 2002 ; Wilson 1983. Well-respected raters have accumulative trust over 
decades, so people may act on this “expert” information, even when it erroneous; See Simonsohn 2011. On the 
importance of legitimacy for the effectiveness of international organizations see Buchanan and Keohane 2006 ; Zürn 
2004.  
23 Sikkink 1993. 
24 Manners 2002. 
25 Monks and Ehrenberg 1999. 
26 Hall and Biersteker 2002. 
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Actors centrally located in a social and political network are better able to set agendas27 and 
impact information flows,28 which facilitates both data collection and GPI dissemination.29  
Both states and non-state actors can accrue social authority, for different reasons. States 
have advantages that flow from their preexisting organization, broad resource base, and in some 
cases their political legitimacy. In contrast, non-state actors’ authority rests on independence 
from powerful political actors. An interesting case is that of the Aid Transparency Index, 
explored by Honig and Weaver. They show that a small meagerly resourced NGO used its 
political independence and first mover advantage to establish the gold standard for funding 
transparency. Political independence is plausibly the strength of several GPIs in our database: 
about half are created by NGOs, and the rest by universities, private actors, or a combination of 
actors. The United States is the only country that has created GPIs that target other states, which 
is only about 6 percent of the total. Overall, GPIs are largely not controlled by individual states 
or IGOs, although those created by the major IGOs and the United States attract more attention 
and on average may be more influential. 
 
Judgment and comparison: provoking status concerns and competition 
GPIs are consequential because they engage the reputation of the persons or entities 
being assessed. A reputation refers to a widespread belief that a person or an organization can 
reliably be characterized in a particular way.30 Status and reputation are related, but status is 
explicitly comparative: it refers to the relative social or professional standing of someone or 
                                                          
27 Carpenter 2011. For related “Social impact theory” see Latané 1981. 
28 Borgatti and Cross 2003. 
29 Stone 2002. 
30 On the reputational impact of comparisons see Kelley 2017. Chapter 2. 
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something in a formal or informal social hierarchy.31  Both reputation and status are 
quintessentially social constructs: they are granted or accorded only by a social community. GPIs 
confer status, which cannot be credibly claimed or manufactured unilaterally by the target. What 
makes this form of information deployment potentially powerful is its ability to broadly impact 
social beliefs about successful states and appropriate policies. It is deployed precisely as a form 
of social pressure on targets to conform – or suffer the reputational consequences, real or 
imagined.  
Exactly why people value their or their country’s status and reputation is hotly debated. 
States and their elites likely seek to cultivate reputations as a form of strategic capital32 to 
improve their payoffs.33 Some care about their reputations for reasons having to do with their 
social role or identity.34 The massive literature on shaming, for example, is built on the premise 
that officials want to avoid damaging their personal, professional or organizational reputations.35 
Bureaucrats, politicians, and their publics36 also care about their own or their country’s relative 
standing, which can be hard to establish in a thinly institutionalized international environment.37  
Status be parlayed into material benefits and/or be an end in itself. 38 International relations 
research accords with similar theories in economics,39 psychology40 and sociology41 in accepting 
                                                          
31 Parks and Masaki (2016) find that policy makers rate comparative assessments as more effective than single 
country assessments.  
32 van Ham 2001.  
33 Tingley and Walter 2011. 
34 Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014. 
35 On social pressures; see Checkel 2001 ; Johnston 2001. On shaming by states or IGOs see Joachim, Reinalda, and 
Verbeek 2008 ; Lebovic and Voeten 2006.;By non-governmental actors, see Hendrix and Wong 2013 ; Murdie and 
Davis 2012 ; Risse 1999. 
36 Rosen 2005 ; Wohlforth 2009.  
37 Dafoe, Renshon, and Huth 2014. 
38 Rege 2008. Some scholarship even suggests that status can propel costly policy choices, even war. See Dafoe, 
Renshon, and Huth 2014. 
39 Harsanyi 1966. 
40 Blader and Chen 2012. 
41 Ridgeway 2013. 
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that people are as motivated by status as by power or material goods, with complex 
consequences for attitudes and behavior. 
GPI creators seek to engage this concern with status and reputation by leveraging 
comparative information among peers.42 Explicit comparisons create contexts in which 
judgments are formed and identities are established and reinforced.43 They foster 
“commensuration,” or “the comparison of different entities according to a common metric,” as a 
way of making highly-simplified sense of the world.44 Labels like “rule of law,” “freedom,” 
“sustainable development,” “peacefulness,” or “political risk” imply that very different entities 
are, for the purposes of one concept, comparable. Numbers facilitate standard-making through 
the simplest possible means – averaging. 45  The recurrent nature of GPIs incentivizes 
governments to look to the next iteration of the index and worry about the reputational 
consequences of their next rating or ranking. Moreover, the media is particularly fond of 
reporting relative rankings; in numerous interviews GPI creators frankly acknowledge that they 
created such indexes precisely to attract media attention.46 About two-thirds of the active GPIs 
employ explicit top-to-bottom ranking systems, and over a third create clear normative 
categories or performance tiers, usually in addition to a ranking or rating. These features render 
GPIs a potent tool for producing social control through the pressure of comparative information.  
 
                                                          
42 In one exceptionally ambitious effort to exercise social control through ranking, China reportedly has pilot 
programs to rate each and every citizen according to a form of “social credit.” See reports at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34592186.  
43 Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004. 
44 Espeland and Sauder 2007 ; Espeland and Stevens 1998. Sinclair 2008. Schueth 2011. Processes of 
commensuration inform global benchmarking; see Broome and Quirk 2015. 
45 Weisband 2000. 
46 This theme was evident in a series of 23 interviews conducted by the authors in Washington DC, August 12-14, 
2014.  
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Pathways to responses: Domestic politics, bureaucratic responses, and transnational pressures 
This symposium explores how comparative rankings influence policy choices through 
multiple mechanisms.47 Figure 2 illustrates how GPIs reverberate through different levels of 
politics: domestic, elite and transnational, and underscores the cyclical nature of iterative 
assessments. 
 
 
Figure 2: From GPIs to policy change: pathways, policy response and reassessment. Adapted 
from Kelley and Simmons 2015 and Kelley 2017. 
 
First, GPIs can provide information that reverberates in domestic politics, especially 
when amplified by the popular or social media or circulated in civil society.48 Important 
domestic audiences include local advocacy organization, local businesses, and even popular 
opinion generally. These groups use the comparative information from GPIs to demand better 
                                                          
47 These processes align with seminal work on information politics, transnational activism and domestic 
mobilization including: Davenport, Eccles, and Prusak 1998 ; Heiss and Kelley 2017 ; Keck and Sikkink 1998 ; 
Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005. In environmental policy, “tote-board diplomacy” has created pressures for change; 
see Levy 1993. We confirmed similar processes in a series of interviews with GPI creators in August 2014, 
Washington DC.  
48 Carpenter 2007 ; McCombs and Shaw 1972.  
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policy, especially when their country apparently lags behind. The underlying information need 
not be wholly new, but the relative performance is. The salience of the new information becomes 
an opportunity to mobilize in several ways: electorally through the ballot box, by publicizing 
critiques of performance in the media, engaging in traditional forms of lobbying, or by protesting 
or engaging in collective action. In responsive political systems, these demands may elicit policy 
change. At a minimum, officials will have the incentive to claim they are addressing the issue. 
However, where institutions repress public input and suppress political demands, governments 
may respond not with reform, but by denigrating the GPI or its creator.49 
Articles in this symposium illustrate how GPIs resonate in domestic politics, creating 
new demands on governments. Honig and Weaver’s research shows that the Aid Transparency 
Index enhances domestic political pressure by equipping transparency reform proponents 
(particularly those with some material power over aid agencies) with critical information and 
clear standards to guide policy change. Bisbee et al argue that the extra scrutiny associated with 
the MDGs criteria encourages greater domestic political attention to those criteria, creating 
demands for more investment in public goods that improve performance on the MDGs, even at 
the sacrifice of other equally important public investments. Businesses use GPIs to demand 
policy reform as well. Morse describes how Thai bankers and industrialists all urged the 
government to modify its laws and improve the image of the country's financial system in 
response to a non-compliance rating.  Her research illustrates how a GPI can shape a domestic 
agenda, drawing attention to policy issues that might otherwise have been entirely disconnected 
from domestic preferences. In a twist, Doshi, Kelley and Simmons show how Modi used the 
Ease of Doing Business Index to provoke domestic awareness and pressure on his own 
                                                          
49 See Kelley 2017, Chapter 4. 
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bureaucrats and provincial governments to move business reregulation along, effectively 
becoming an ally of the World Bank’s agenda. 
Second, many GPIs involve intensive consultations with government bureaucrats during 
which officials take “expert” advice directly into account in their policymaking.50 Such 
monitoring signals the value the monitor and other actors attach to specific tasks,51 and can 
influence targets to internalize monitoring regimes and eventually to self-regulate — a process 
that may mistakenly lead to underestimation of monitoring’s effects.52 Referred to as the 
“Hawthorne effect,” individuals in experimental settings have been found to re-arrange their 
priorities to meet external expectations when they are aware of being observed.53 This form of 
reactivity—the tendency for people to change their behavior in response to being evaluated—
may explain the effect, for example, of US News and World Report’s Best Colleges and Best 
Grad Schools rankings on university priorities.54 When a monitoring regime is applied generally 
to like units, it eventually gains acceptance by undercutting claims that the monitors have singled 
out specific targets “unfairly.”55  
Used in conjunction with monitoring, GPIs directly engage the reputations for 
competence and effectiveness of specific officials and their agencies. When GPIs target policies 
for which specific ministries are directly responsible, officials initiate policy change to deflect 
criticism that could damage their reputations. As Honig and Weaver find, elites responded to the 
Aid Transparency Index by inter- and intra-organizational learning, adopting its norms, and 
professionalizing aid staff and management around the specific standards of transparency that the 
                                                          
50 Parks and Masaki.(2016) find that GPIs on which bureaucrats are consulted are among the most salient to 
government officials. On the importance of bureaucrats’ reputations, see Chwieroth 2013 ; Nelson 2017. 
51 Larson and Callahan 1990. 
52 Self-regulation has been found effective in the context of health and safety monitoring by OSHA; Johnson 2017. 
53 Adair 1984. 
54 Espeland and Sauder 2007. 
55 Löwenheim 2008. 
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index promotes. Doshi, Kelley and Simmons (this volume) note that some states have literally 
created agencies tasked to develop policies that meet the expectations of the World Bank, and 
show that politicians such as Modi use salient GPIs to justify the job they have done, take credit 
for progress, and set goals for the future.  
Finally, GPIs activate transnational pressures and influence how third parties such as 
foreign investors, donors or other states respond to – or are anticipated to respond to – the 
ratings. Many familiar rating systems leverage social pressure to conform primarily through third 
parties: universities respond to the U.S News and World Reports rating system because 
applicants do;56 hospitals respond because patients do;57 firms respond to environmental rankings 
because investors do.58 Importantly, raters themselves need not control material resources to 
unleash transnational pressures. Morse’s research in this symposium shows that a non-
cooperative designation by FATF on anti-money laundering policies can lead international banks 
to be less willing to lend money to banks in listed countries. Interestingly, however, Bisbee et 
al’s examination of budget decisions in response to MDG goals shows that while primary 
education aid flows respond to the MDGs, there is no evidence that aid flows mediate the 
government’s own response to the MDGs. Rather, the MDGs appear to work through domestic 
information channels.  
  
III. What have we learned? 
                                                          
56 Luca and Smith 2013 ; Meredith 2004 ; Monks and Ehrenberg 1999. 
57 Pope 2009. 
58 Aaron, McMillan, and Cline 2012 ; Murguia and Lence 2014. Murguia and Lence found that getting one position 
closer to the top of Newsweek’s “Global 100 Green Rankings” increases the value of an average firm in the list by 
eleven million dollars. 
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The contributions in this symposium apply an eclectic set of methods to greatly expand 
our knowledge about how GPIs influence states’ policies. Important decisions ride on such 
rankings, from significant changes in the criminal code (Morse) to increased aid transparency 
(Honig and Weaver) to allocation of school funding (Bisbee et al) to business deregulation 
(Doshi, Kelley and Simmons). Together these cases show that GPIs are indeed powerful, their 
influence is not isomorphic with material resources, and their influence operates across a wider 
set of actors and issues than previously demonstrated. 
This symposium also adds insights into broader questions of who can exercise power and 
authority through GPIs. Three of our symposium contributions examine GPIs created by IGOs 
with varying degrees of leverage: The United Nations, while comprehensive, is often considered 
rather toothless; the World Bank has considerable economic leverage but claims to maintain a 
firewall between lending and ranking decisions; and the FATF is a standard-setting body without 
enforcement powers. Even governments’ decisions about education spending do not appear to 
depend exclusively on how the MDGs affect foreign aid flows. The evidence points more 
towards the domestic information effects and elite bureaucratic channels of MDGs. Sometimes 
even poorly-resourced NGOs such as Publish What You Fund can successfully leverage GPIs. 
Empirical evidence across different types of actors shows that it is not necessary that the GPI 
creator be an already-powerful state or IGO.  
Can GPIs work in the face of disagreement on what constitutes appropriate policy, or do 
they primarily nudge states in directions that reflect broad social consensus? Again, the articles 
in this symposium suggest some answers. The World Bank’s focus on business deregulation has 
sparked massive pushback from environmental and labor groups and major powers such as 
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China.59 Yet despite these dissenters, numerous governments try to climb the ranking in the 
belief that a poor ranking is bad for their investment climate. The MDGs’ focus on education 
enrollment, which critics have long argued fails to capture the quality of education, is also 
controversial.60 Even a topic as seemingly innocuous as aid transparency has stoked debate about 
whether this focus is productive. Lack of consensus often spurs GPI promulgation in the first 
place. Thus, consensus is not a necessary condition for GPI success, although we would expect 
rankings to have even more clout when they reinforce broadly held social values. 
Our framework suggests some important scope conditions, which should be the subject of 
future research. First, domestic governing structures can be expected to produce heterogeneous 
outcomes.  Regime type, the density of civil society actors and the information environment are 
all likely to temper GPI effects.61 Second, GPI influence will also vary based on local values. 
Although GPIs have strong agenda-setting powers, they cannot be expected to force action to 
which local elites are utterly opposed or where the message does not resonate at all with local 
actors. Third, GPIs are limited by the capacity of the rated entities to respond. A range of 
conditions can undermine state capacity, from pervasive political violence to corruption to severe 
resource shortages. As a corollary, GPIs are more likely to be influential when they are 
actionable. It is considerably easier for all countries to change a fee, for example, than it is to 
quickly improve child mortality or perceptions about corruption. This likely explains the near 
absence of GPIs focused on military issues. The security-related indices that do exist resemble 
simple data without ambitious statements that they intend to influence state policies. Fourth, 
when the creator lacks social importance to the target, GPIs are easily ignored. Again, this 
                                                          
59 Doshi, Kelley and Simmons this symposium. 
60  Filmer, Hasan, and Pritchett 2006. 
61 Dai 2007. See also Hall and Biersteker 2002 ; Simmons 2009. Koppell 2005. 
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suggests a corollary: social isolates, such as North Korea, are inherently weak candidates for GPI 
influence. As with many forms of external pressure, there may be a sweet spot for maximal GPI 
impact centering on transitioning democracies, the middle-income countries and/or emerging 
markets.  
In addition, while it is reasonable to hypothesize that, all things equal, material leverage 
or predominant power increase GPI influence, the contributions show that it is not necessary for 
the creators to possess these traits. Our framework proposes – and the empirical research shows – 
that GPIs work primarily through reputational concerns sparked by comparative information. 
Even in the case of the FATF blacklist, which relies primarily on markets to incentivize policy 
change, Morse finds that officials profess to be more motivated by a desire for a clean 
international reputation than a specific market reaction. The symposium research thus 
consolidates prior claims that GPIs are strongly driven by reputational concerns while allowing 
that material leverage and reputation-engaging information likely interact.62 
Finally, this symposium has called attention to the possibility of unintended effects. GPIs 
target specific policies and behaviors, but if governments operate with fixed resources, they may 
shift their priorities to meet GPI expectations, as shown by Bisbee et al. States tend to game 
ranking systems, something that at least some states like Georgia appear to have done with 
respect to the EDB Index.63 This does not mean that all concerted efforts to improve are shallow, 
but it does highlight a possible cost of using rankings for motivation.  
 
                                                          
62 Kelley and Simmons 2015 explore, but do not find, such interactive effects, while Kelley 2017 finds some 
evidence that material leverage enhances GPI effects. 
63 Schueth 2011. 
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IV. An Agenda for Research 
Globalization, accountability, and technology are changing important aspects of global 
governance. While coercion, enforcement and material sanctions have often taken pride of place 
as major movers of interstate relations, scholars and policy agents alike have come to appreciate 
the multifaceted nature of power exerted more subtly and gradually.64 The proliferation of GPIs 
is one example of such power. They contain ideas and worldviews, and they attempt to 
“regulate” through non-coercive means. When promulgated by authoritative actors, GPIs may 
have direct, indirect and even unintended effects. Establishing causality is challenging, but the 
symposium contributors present corroborating evidence to establish highly plausible channels of 
GPI influence.  
Research on GPIs raises a profound issue: how does assessment power affect worldwide 
authority relationships in the modern information age more generally?65 At present it is too early 
to be sure. Our data show that rich states and wealthy actors overwhelmingly do the rating, while 
the poor are often the ones being assessed. GPIs are potentially more useful for nudging policy 
change than traditional coercive power resources, like economic and military sanctions. They 
effectively supplement other sources of leverage under the control of developed countries. Some 
evidence suggests their creators realize this and do not squander perceptions of GPI legitimacy 
with overt political or economic pressure, as the firewalling of the EDB office from the loan 
office at the World Bank suggests. The FATF does not sanction non-compliant jurisdictions and 
does not require or even urge its membership to do so. These powerful actors – who could in 
theory choose otherwise – prefer to stage competition and engage reputations rather than threaten 
                                                          
64 Baldwin 2016 ; Barnett and Duvall 2005.  
65 Büthe 2012 ; Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry 2012 ; Löwenheim 2008. 
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sanctions or exert political pressure. Non-state actors have also used GPIs to influence discourse, 
agendas and, ultimately, outcomes, and the case of Aid Transparency Index suggests they are 
sometimes successful.66 But to date, the authority to define the game and to keep score rather 
firmly resides with existing centers of global power.   
Future research should prioritize several issues. First, primary research informed by 
psychology and sociology should investigate what makes ratings and rankings – and the 
information on which they are based – believable. Second, more research can be done on the 
information milieu in which GPIs compete. The papers in this symposium are clear about the 
information ecology of their specific GPI, but it would be useful to know much more about 
whether and how GPIs compete with other forms of information. Relatedly, it would be useful to 
know not only why some GPIs seem to succeed, but also why others gain no traction at all. This 
would require further investigation of first mover advantages, the authority of the promulgator, 
and the marketing of ideas in the form of comparative data globally. Third, we envision more 
intensive research on informational contestation. We have provided a flavor of that contestation, 
but much more can be done to theorize the politics of information gathering and deployment 
globally. Fourth, scholars should explore how non-state actors develop sophisticated information 
campaigns. While shaming has taken center stage in the study of global advocacy groups, less 
attention has been given to advocates’ capacity to develop and deploy methodologically 
transparent performance measures. Fifth, as with any policy instrument, future research should 
focus not only on whether they obtain their objectives but also at what possible costs, including 
possible unintended consequences. Sixth, while we have shown that an array of different types of 
actors use GPIs with success, future research should test the limits of the claim that GPIs can 
                                                          
66 Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010 ; Hale and Held 2011 ; Hale and Roger 2014. 
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disperse influence beyond traditional power centers. Seventh, our contribution has found a strong 
rule of reputation, yet we also recognize the link with material leverage. Future research should 
continue to investigate the interactive consequences of material leverage and reputation-
engaging information. 
Finally, it would be useful to link research on GPIs as social knowledge and social 
pressure with other new forms of global governance.  GPIs are unique in their reiterated, public 
and comparative nature. They are potentially useful as a contemporary ‘hybrid’ governance tool, 
along with other methods of external influence, such as public-private partnerships,67 
experimental governance,68 and multi-stakeholder initiatives.69 Now may be the time to think 
creatively about how GPIs support or undermine governance in the presence of what Michael 
Zürn refers to as growing global governance dilemmas.70 As the increasing prevalence of 
interstate efforts to manipulate social media and other information flows shows, strategic use of 
information is rapidly becoming an ever more potent tool of influence. Addressing GPI impact 
on discourse, governance and global and local power relations is an ambitious research agenda, 
but the ideas in this symposium provide a strong start.
                                                          
67 Börzel and Risse 2005 ; Osborne 2002 ; Schäferhoff, Campe, and Kaan 2009. 
68 De Búrca, Keohane, and Sabel 2014 ; Szyszczak 2006. 
69 Bäckstrand 2006 ; O’Rourke 2006. 
70 Zürn 2018. 
 
 
 
23 
References: 
Aaron, Joshua R., Amy McMillan, and Brandon N. Cline. 2012. Investor Reaction to Firm Environmental 
Management Reputation. Corp Reputation Rev 15 (4): 304-318. 
Adair, John G. 1984. The Hawthorne effect: A reconsideration of the methodological artifact. . Journal of 
Applied Psychology 69 (2): 334-345. 
Apaza, Carmen R. 2009. Measuring governance and corruption through the worldwide governance 
indicators: Critiques, responses, and ongoing scholarly discussion. PS: Political Science & 
Politics 42 (01): 139-143. 
Arndt, Christiane. 2008. The Politics of Governance Ratings. International Public Management Journal 
11 (3): 275-297. 
Arndt, Christiane, Charles Oman, Co-operation Organisation for Economic, and Centre Development. 
Development. 2006. Uses and abuses of governance indicators.  of Development Centre studies. 
Paris: Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
Ashmore, Richard D, Kay Deaux, and Tracy  McLaughlin-Volpe. 2004. An Organizing Framework for 
Collective Identity: Articulation and Significance of Multidimensionalit. Psychological Bulletin 
130 (1): 80-114. 
Avant, Deborah D., Martha Finnemore, and Susan K. Sell, eds. 2010. Who governs the globe?, 
Cambridge studies in international relations ; 114. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Bäckstrand, Karin. 2006. Multi‐stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development: rethinking 
legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness. European Environment 16 (5): 290-306. 
Baldwin, David A. 2016. Power and international relations: A conceptual approach. Princeton 
University Press. 
Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. 2005. Power in international politics. International organization 
59 (1): 39-75. 
Blader, Steven L., and Ya-Ru Chen. 2012. Differentiating the effects of status and power: A justice 
perspective. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 102 (5): 994-1014. 
Borgatti, Stephen P, and Rob Cross. 2003. A relational view of information seeking and learning in social 
networks. Management science 49 (4): 432-445. 
Börzel, Tanja, and Thomas Risse. 2005. "Public-Private Partnerships: Effective and legitimate tools of 
international governance." In Complex Sovereignty, eds. Lou Pauly and Edgar Grande. Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press. 195-216. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1989. Social space and symbolic power. Sociological theory 7 (1): 14-25. 
Broome, Andre, and Joel Quirk. 2015. Governing the world at a distance: the practice of global 
benchmarking. Review of International Studies 41 (Special Issue 05): 819-841. 
Buchanan, Allen, and Robert O Keohane. 2006. The legitimacy of global governance institutions. Ethics 
& international affairs 20 (4): 405-437. 
Büthe, Tim. 2012. Beyond supply and demand: a political-economic conceptual model. Governance by 
indicators: global power through classification and rankings: 29-51. 
Carpenter, R Charli. 2007. Setting the advocacy agenda: Theorizing issue emergence and nonemergence 
in transnational advocacy networks. International Studies Quarterly 51 (1): 99-120. 
Carpenter, R. Charli. 2011. Vetting the Advocacy Agenda: Network Centrality and the Paradox of 
Weapons Norms. International Organization 65 (01): 69-102. 
Chayes, Abram, and Antonia Handler Chayes. 1995. The new sovereignty: compliance with international 
regulatory agreements. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
Checkel, Jeffrey T. 2001. Why comply? Social learning and European identity change. International 
Organization 55 (3): 553-588. 
Chwieroth, Jeffrey M. 2013. “The silent revolution:” How the staff exercise informal governance over 
IMF lending. The Review of international organizations 8 (2): 265-290. 
Dafoe, Allan, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth. 2014. Reputation and status as motives for war. 
Available at SSRN 2332048. 
 
 
 
24 
Dai, Xinyuan. 2007. International institutions and national policies. Cambridge, UK ; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Davenport, Thomas H, Robert G Eccles, and Laurence Prusak. 1998. Information politics. The strategic 
management of intellectual capital: 101-120. 
Davis, Kevin E, Benedict Kingsbury, and Sally Engle Merry. 2012. Indicators as a technology of global 
governance. Law & Society Review 46 (1): 71-104. 
Davis, Kevin E., Angelina  Fisher, Benedict   Kingsbury, and Sally Engle Merry, eds. 2012. Governance 
by indicators : global power through classification and rankings. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Davis, Kevin E., Sally Engle Merry, and Benedict Kingsbury. 2015. The quiet power of indicators : 
measuring governance, corruption, and the rule of law. Cambridge University Press. 
De Búrca, Gráinne, Robert O. Keohane, and Charles Sabel. 2014. Global Experimentalist Governance. 
British Journal of Political Science 44 (03): 477-486. 
Espeland, Wendy Nelson, and Mitchell L Stevens. 1998. Commensuration as a social process. Annual 
review of sociology 24 (1): 313-343. 
Espeland, Wendy Nelson, and Michael  Sauder. 2007. Rankings and Reactivity: How Public Measures 
Recreate Social Worlds. American Journal of Sociology 113 (1): 1-40. 
Filmer, Deon, Amer Hasan, and Lant Pritchett. 2006. A millennium learning goal: Measuring real 
progress in education. 
Fioramonti, Lorenzo. 2013. Gross domestic problem: The politics behind the world's most powerful 
number. Zed Books. 
Ginsburg, Alan, Geneise  Cooke, Steve  Leinwand, Jay   Noell, and Elizabeth Pollock. 2005. Reassessing 
US International Mathematics Performance: New Findings from the 2003 TIMSS and PISA. 
American Institutes for Research. 
Hale, Thomas, and David Held. 2011. Handbook of transnational governance. Polity. 
Hale, Thomas, and Charles Roger. 2014. Orchestration and transnational climate governance. The Review 
of International Organizations 9 (1): 59-82. 
Hall, Rodney Bruce, and Thomas J Biersteker. 2002. The emergence of private authority in global 
governance. Vol. 85. Cambridge University Press. 
Hammersley, Martyn. 2005. Is the evidence-based practice movement doing more good than harm? 
Evidence & policy 1 (1): 85-100. 
Hansen, Hans Krause. 2012. The power of performance indices in the global politics of anti-corruption. 
Journal of International Relations and Development 15 (4): 506-531. 
Harsanyi, John C. 1966. A bargaining model for social status in informal groups and formal 
organizations. Behavioral Science 11 (5): 357-369. 
Heiss, Andrew, and Judith G. Kelley. 2017. From the Trenches: A Global Survey of Anti-TIP NGOs and 
Their Views of U.S. Efforts. Journal of Human Trafficking 3 (3): 231-254. 
Hendrix, Cullen S, and Wendy H Wong. 2013. When is the pen truly mighty? Regime type and the 
efficacy of naming and shaming in curbing human rights abuses. British Journal of Political 
Science 43 (03): 651-672. 
Høyland, Bjørn, Karl Moene, and Fredrik Willumsen. 2012. The tyranny of international index rankings. 
Journal of Development Economics 97 (1): 1-14. 
Joachim, Jutta M., Bob Reinalda, and Bertjan Verbeek, eds. 2008. International organizations and 
implementation : enforcers, managers, authorities? London ; New York: Routledge/ECPR. 
Johnson, Matthew. 2017. "Regulation by Shaming: Deterrence Effects of Publicizing Violations of 
Workplace Safety and Health Laws." Duke University. 
Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2001. Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. International 
Studies Quarterly 45 (4): 487-516. 
Karpik, Lucien. 2010. Valuing the unique : the economics of singularities. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
 
 
25 
Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Pablo Zoido. August 1999. Governance Matters. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 2196: Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=188568. 
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists beyond borders : advocacy networks in 
international politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Kelley, Judith G. 2017. Scorecard diplomacy: Grading states to influence their reputation and behavior. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Koppell, Jonathan GS. 2005. Pathologies of accountability: ICANN and the challenge of “multiple 
accountabilities disorder”. Public administration review 65 (1): 94-108. 
Larson, James R., and Christine Callahan. 1990. Performance monitoring: How it affects work 
productivity. Journal of Applied Psychology 75 (5): 530-538. 
Latané, Bibb 1981. American Psychologist. The psychology of social impact 36 (4): 343-356. 
Lebovic, James H, and Erik Voeten. 2006. The Politics of Shame: The Condemnation of Country Human 
Rights Practices in the UNCHR. International Studies Quarterly 50 (4): 861-888. 
Levy, Marc A. 1993. "European Acid Rain: The Power of Tote-Board Diplomacy." In Institutions for the 
earth: sources of effective international environmental protection, eds. Peter M Haas, Robert 
Owen Keohane and Marc A Levy. Cambridge: Mit Press. 75-132. 
Löwenheim, Oded. 2008. Examining the State: a Foucauldian perspective on international 'governance 
indicators'. Third World Quarterly 29 (2): 255-274. 
Luca, Michael, and Jonathan Smith. 2013. Salience in Quality Disclosure: Evidence from the U.S. News 
College Rankings. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 22 (1): 58-77. 
Malito, Debora Valentina , Gaby  Umbach, and Nehal  Bhuta, eds. 2018. The Palgrave Handbook of 
Indicators in Global Governance. Cham: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Manners, Ian. 2002. Normative power Europe: a contradiction in terms? JCMS: Journal of common 
market studies 40 (2): 235-258. 
McCombs, Maxwell E, and Donald L Shaw. 1972. The agenda-setting function of mass media. Public 
opinion quarterly 36 (2): 176-187. 
Meredith, Marc. 2004. Why Do Universities Compete in the Ratings Game? An Empirical Analysis of the 
Effects of the U.S. News and World Report College Rankings. Research in Higher Education 45 
(5): 443-461. 
Merry, Sally Engle, and John M Conley. 2011. Measuring the world: indicators, human rights, and global 
governance. Current Anthropology 52 (S3): 000-000. 
Miller, Clark A. 2005. New Civic Epistemologies of Quantification: Making Sense of Indicators of Local 
and Global Sustainability. Science, Technology & Human Values 30 (3): 403-432. 
Monks, James, and Ronald G. Ehrenberg. 1999. U.S. News & World Report's College Rankings: Why 
They Do Matter. Change: The Magazine of Higher Learning 31 (6): 42-51. 
Murdie, Amanda M., and David R. Davis. 2012. Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the 
Impact of Human Rights INGOs1. International Studies Quarterly 56 (1): 1-16. 
Murguia, Juan M, and Sergio H Lence. 2014. Investors’ Reaction to Environmental Performance: A 
Global Perspective of the Newsweek ’s “Green Rankings”. Environmental and Resource 
Economics: 1-23. 
Nelson, Stephen Craig. 2017. The Currency of Confidence: How Economic Beliefs Shape the IMF's 
Relationship with Its Borrowers. Cornell University Press. 
Nutley, Sandra M, Huw TO Davies, and Peter C Smith. 2000. What works?: Evidence-based policy and 
practice in public services. MIT Press. 
O’Rourke, Dara. 2006. Multi-stakeholder regulation: privatizing or socializing global labor standards? 
World development 34 (5): 899-918. 
Osborne, Stephen. 2002. Public-private partnerships: Theory and practice in international perspective. 
Routledge. 
Parks, Bradley, and Takaaki Masaki. 2016. When Do Performance Assessments Influence Policy 
Behavior? Micro-Evidence from the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey. Presented at the APSA Annual 
Conference, Mini-Conference on Assessment Power in World Politics, Philadelphia PA. 
 
 
 
26 
Pawson, Ray. 2006. Evidence-based policy: A realist perspective. Sage publications. 
Pope, Devin G. 2009. Reacting to rankings: Evidence from “America's Best Hospitals”. Journal of Health 
Economics 28 (6): 1154-1165. 
Rege, Mari. 2008. Why do people care about social status? Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 66 (2): 233-242. 
Ridgeway, Cecilia L. 2013. Why Status Matters for Inequality. American Sociological Review. 
Rieh, Soo Young. 2002. Judgment of information quality and cognitive authority in the Web. Journal of 
the American Society for Information Science and Technology 53 (2): 145-161. 
Risse, Thomas. 1999. International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behavior 
in the Human Rights Area. Politics and Society 27 (4): 529-559. 
Ron, James, Howard Ramos, and Kathleen Rodgers. 2005. Transnational Information Politics: NGO 
Human Rights Reporting, 1986–2000. International Studies Quarterly 49 (3): 557-587. 
Rosen, Stephen Peter. 2005. War and human nature. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Sanderson, Ian. 2002. Evaluation, policy learning and evidence‐based policy making. Public 
administration 80 (1): 1-22. 
Schäferhoff, Marco, Sabine Campe, and Christopher Kaan. 2009. Transnational Public‐Private 
Partnerships in International Relations. International Studies Review 11 (3): 451-474. 
Scheufele, Dietram, and David Tewksbury. 2007. Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution 
of Three Media Effects Models. Journal of Communication 57 (1): 9-20. 
Schueth, Sam. 2011. Assembling international competitiveness: The Republic of Georgia, USAID, and 
the Doing Business project. Economic geography 87 (1): 51-77. 
Sikkink, Kathryn. 1993. Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America. 
International Organization 47 (3): 411-441. 
Simmons, Beth A. 2009. Mobilizing for human rights : international law in domestic politics. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Simonsohn, Uri. 2011. Lessons from an “Oops” at Consumer Reports: Consumers Follow Experts and 
Ignore Invalid Information. Journal of Marketing Research 48 (1): 1-12. 
Sinclair, Timothy J. 2008. The new masters of capital: American bond rating agencies and the politics of 
creditworthiness. Cornell University Press. 
Stanton, Elizabeth A. 2007. The human development index: A history. 
Stone, Diane. 2002. Introduction: global knowledge and advocacy networks. Global Networks 2 (1): 1-12. 
Szyszczak, Erika. 2006. Experimental governance: the open method of coordination. European Law 
Journal 12 (4): 486-502. 
Thomas, Melissa A. 2010. What do the worldwide governance indicators measure? The European 
Journal of Development Research 22 (1): 31-54. 
Tingley, Dustin H., and Barbara F. Walter. 2011. The Effect of Repeated Play on Reputation Building: 
An Experimental Approach. International Organization 65 (2): 343-365. 
van de Walle, Steven. 2006. The state of the world's bureaucracies. Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis: Research and Practice 8 (4): 437-448. 
van Ham, Peter. 2001. The Rise of the Brand State: The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation. 
Foreign Affairs 80 (5): 2-6. 
Weisband, Edward. 2000. Discursive Multilateralism: Global benchmarks, Shame, and Learning in the 
ILO Labor Standards Monitoring Regime. International Studies Quarterly 44 (4): 643-666. 
Wilson, Patrick. 1983. Second-hand knowledge : an inquiry into cognitive authority. Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press. 
Wohlforth, William, C. 2009. Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War. World Politics 61 
(1): 28-57. 
Zürn, Michael. 2004. Global governance and legitimacy problems. Government and Opposition 39 (2): 
260-287. 
———. 2018. A Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy, and Contestation. Oxford 
University Press. 
 
 
 
27 
 
